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Providing anonymous communication on networks of interconnected computers is 
an active area of research which aims to enhance the privacy of the users of such 
networks. Communication unobservability is a stronger property compared to anonymity 
that attempts to guarantee that the adversaries will not even notice that a communication 
between a sender and a receiver is happening. In networks where an active global 
adversary may be present, it is assumed that at all times, all nodes in the network are 
potentially being monitored and also that at any time, any node should be treated as a 
possible adversary.  
This thesis work introduces a set of requirements which, if followed in any 
system, provides enhanced anonymous communication. Furthermore, following these 
requirements, a new anonymous networking system was designed. This system provides 
communication unobservability in the presence of active global adversaries through 
randomized routing and unpredictable aging. Randomized routing is used to obfuscate the 
message routing pattern and the communication path, and unpredictable aging is used to 
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With the tremendous increase in the use of the Internet during the past few years, 
there is a growing concern about the users’ privacy on the net. The Internet is used by 
millions of people on a daily basis to check email, read news, watch videos, transfer files, 
etc. These activities involve network communication with other computers around the 
world. As long as this communication goes through the Internet which is a part of a 
service provided by an ISP (Internet Service Provider), it is susceptible to intervention. 
Every single computer that is located in the path of the communication and is used to 
route packets is potentially capable of monitoring, logging, and analyzing the traffic.  
1.2 Problem Statement 
The Internet traffic that goes through several nodes before being arrived at the 
destination may well contain personal and private data such as usernames, passwords, 
bank account information, and numerous other important potentially identifying data. 
This sensitive information, if accurately linked to the sender or the receiver, may 




Also, the way packets are routed in the Internet, ISPs could be used as a mean of 
censoring/filtering and/or imposing restrictions on the freedom of speech in general or 
monitoring the users’ activities via identifying the two end points of a communication 
link in particular. Thus, finding an effective and practical method of hiding the identity of 
nodes involved in any given communication on the Internet is increasingly important. 
1.3 Assumptions and Research Objectives 
Several projects have been introduced to address this issue but, due to certain 
technical difficulties or assumptions made by their designers, the issue of privacy and 
anonymous communication on the Internet is still an open problem that affects the daily 
lives of millions of people. In this thesis work, the problem of Communication 
Unobservability in the Presence of Active Global Adversaries was considered. In other 
words, it was assumed that the adversary can monitor all nodes in the network at all 
times, as well as take part in the communication (hence referred to as an active global 
adversary). The goal was to strive to provide a level of anonymity that would prevent the 
adversary from even noticing that any communication between a sender and a receiver is 







2.1 Chapter Overview 
During the past three decades, several projects have been introduced to address 
the issue of providing private and anonymous communication. This chapter briefly 
describes some of the most notable such efforts as well as their advantages and 
disadvantages, and the main reason that these systems do not address the principal issue 
discussed in the current thesis work, i.e., communication unobservability. 
2.2 Chaum’s Mix Network 
The first anonymous system, Chaum’s Mix Network, was introduced in 1981 by 
David Chaum [Chaum 81]. Mix is probably the most extensively researched and 
implemented anonymous system [Kelly 09]. The Mix network is based on the concept of 
a mix which is considered trusted by all other nodes in the network [Chaum 81]. A mix 
basically refers to a store-and-forward device that hides the correspondences between the 
items in its input and those in its output. Messages arrive at a mix from various senders 
and the mix is responsible for hiding the order of arrivals by outputting lexicographically-
ordered batches of uniformly-sized items [Chaum 81].  
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In a mix system, each packet is encrypted by the mix public key and consists of 
three parts: the address of the recipient, the message body that is encrypted by the 
recipient’s public key, and a random string that is meant to obfuscate the encrypted 
message and reduce the possibility of success in case of dictionary attacks. A mix 
decrypts the messages upon arrival by throwing away the random string and forwarding 
the message body to the recipient with the given address in a way that the correspondence 
between the incoming message and the outgoing message is hidden. 
The advantages of a mix network are the simplicity of the design and the 
implementation as well as a guaranteed level of communication performance due to 
having only a single extra layer intervening between every two communicating nodes, 
namely the mix itself. 
The most important disadvantage of the mix system is that the mix itself has to be 
trusted by the other nodes in the network. By contrast, since in this thesis work an active 
global adversary is assumed to be present, no node in the network can be trusted. Every 
node is a potential adversary, including the mix. Therefore, since a mix has exact 
knowledge of the address of the initial sender and the ultimate receiver of a message, a 
mix network is not capable of providing communication anonymity in the presence of an 
active global adversary. 
2.3 Mix-Based Anonymous Systems 
Since the introduction of Chaum’s mix network in 1981, several systems based on 
the idea of a mix have been developed. The three most widely-known such systems are 
briefly described below. 
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 Anonymizer is a Hyper-Text Transport Protocol (HTTP) proxy that is based on a 
single node mix (i.e., the Anonymizer-Server) and aims to provide sender 
anonymity and fast web surfing facility [Boyan 97]. The most important 
drawback of this system is its centralized nature. In other words, the system is as 
anonymous as the Anonymizer-Server node is. Furthermore, having all traffic go 
through a central station makes the network vulnerable to denial of service attacks        
[Kelly 09].  
 WebMIX or Java Anonymous Proxy is an anonymous web surfing network proxy 
that is based on the notion of a Mix Cascade [Chaum 81] and aims to provide 
real-time anonymous and unobservable Internet access [Berthold et al. 2001]. A 
cascade mix is a series of mixes, connected in a row, such that the output from 
one mix is the input to another. Picking up on that theme, the input to the first mix 
in the cascade is the input to the mix network and the output from the last mix in 
the cascade is the output from the mix network [Chaum 81]. The main strength of 
this system is that it allows users to choose between different mix cascades [Kelly 
09], but still the mix itself has to be trusted by all nodes in the network.  
 Remailers consists of three components: 1. Type I Remailer, a.k.a. Cyberpunk       
[Goldberg et al. 97], which is the first widely used implementation of Mix 
networks [Borisov 05], 2. Type II Remailer, a.k.a. Mixmaster [Möller et al. 03], and 
3. Type III Remailer, a.k.a. Mixminion [Danezis et al. 03]. The three remailers are 
based on the idea of a mix network that receives messages from senders, removes 
the message header, and uses Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) encryption  
[Zimmermann 95] to wrap messages and deliver them anonymously. The most 
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noteworthy weakness of the Remailer systems, just like any other mix-based 
anonymous system, is that the mix itself is aware of the location of the original 
sender node and the ultimate receiver node and thus, if compromised, it is capable 
of revealing the identity of the nodes involved in any given communication link. 
2.4 The Onion Routing (Tor) 
The Onion Routing is another extensively researched and mature project on 
anonymous communication. This system is in principle very similar to a mix cascade and 
provides anonymity by repeatedly encrypting the messages using the public keys of the 
relay nodes [Reed et al. 98] [Dingledine et al. 04]. The major issue with The Onion 
Routing is that the first node involved in the communication path after the original sender 
node is well-aware of the identity of the original sender and therefore, if compromised, 
the identity of the sender may be easily revealed. 
In a Tor system, once a node is connected to the network, a list of other nodes 
involved in the network is retrieved. This list is used to create a path from the local node 
(the ultimate sender) to a receiver node with a number of intermediate overlay nodes (the 
default for Tor is three nodes). This path is stored in each packet and serves as the routing 
algorithm. 
Packets are constructed by encrypting a message body along with the IP address 
of the next node, once for each node in the path. A packet is decrypted upon arrival at a 
node in order to determine the next node in the route. 
The main disadvantage of The Onion Routing is that even a passive global 
adversary is easily capable of identifying the sender node via monitoring the network 
traffic. This is due to the fact that from a global adversary’s point of view, it is clearly 
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visible which node has started the communication and which nodes are involved in 
relaying the messages from the sender node to the receiver node. Thus, The Onion 






3.1 Chapter Overview 
A study of the existing anonymous communication systems (as outlined in 
Chapter II) indicated that providing anonymous communication is still an open problem 
and there is a need for other systems to tackle the issue of privacy and anonymity 
especially in the presence of active global adversaries. 
In this thesis work, this issue is addressed while keeping in mind that the problem 
stems from two fundamental concerns: 
1. All nodes in the network are potentially being monitored by the (global) adversary 
at all times. 
2. Every node is potentially an agent of the adversary and is capable of collecting 
information and reporting to the adversary. 
In this chapter, a set of requirements that govern the underlying design of the proposed 
system is introduced. The contention is that any system that follows these requirements 
has the potential to tackle the obstacles mentioned above and provide a solution to the 




3.2. Requirement 1: Trust NO ONE 
An active adversary is an adversary that is capable of joining the network, 
interfering with the communication, and even compromising nodes. This property of the 
adversary under study here may result in the second obstacle mentioned above in Section 
3.1. In other words, if the adversary is an active one, then theoretically all the nodes to 
which the adversary has access may be compromised and used by the adversary to collect 
information and report back. Furthermore, a global adversary has access to the whole 
body of the network, thus all nodes in the network (except for the sender and the 
receiver) could be potentially assisting the adversary in order to discover the identity of 
the two ends of the communication link. 
In such a case where every node is potentially an agent of the adversary, we 
cannot afford to trust any node in the network with the exact knowledge of the ultimate 
sender, the ultimate receiver, and the contents of the message except for the two ends of 
the communication link. Therefore, only the receiver node may be aware of the exact 
address of the sender node, and only the sender node may be aware of the exact address 
of the receiver node. This is the most important requirement that is unique to the case of 
having active global adversaries. 
3.3 Requirement 2: Always Encrypt Uniform Sized Packets 
The overarching issue to consider here is that the contents of the message must 
always be encrypted at the initial sender node using the public key of the ultimate 
receiver. This is essential because if non-encrypted contents are transferred, it is easy for 
any node in the middle of the communication link to have access to the details of the 
communication and potentially report them to the adversary. But only encrypting the 
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message at the initial sender is not sufficient when the adversary is capable of monitoring 
all nodes in the network. In this case, it is vital to prevent dictionary attacks and traffic 
analysis by the adversary. 
To further explain this issue, let’s consider this example: node A is going to send 
a message to node C through node B. As mentioned above, node A has to encrypt the 
message using node C’s public key so that the message is only readable by node C. But 
let’s assume that no other encryption is involved. From the adversary’s point of view, a 
message with unreadable contents is sent from node A to node B, and then the same 
message is sent from node B to node C. The issue here is that the adversary is able to 
detect that the very same message that was sent from node A to B, was also sent from 
node B to C. Therefore, simple traffic analysis techniques can be used by the adversary to 
easily identify the initial sender and the ultimate receiver of any given message. 
In the above-mentioned example, the only way to guarantee that the adversary is 
not able to detect that the same message was transferred between nodes is salting and re-
encrypting message at each and every intervening relay node. A salt is a random value 
that is attached to the contents of a message before encryption in order to harden it 
against possible dictionary attacks. In other words, in the above-mentioned example, 
node A has to further encrypt the message along with a salt before sending it to node B. 
Then, node B has to decrypt the message, remove the salt, attach a different salt to the 
message, encrypt it again, and send it to node C. Finally, node C has to decrypt the 
message, remove the salt, and decrypt the message again using its private key to access 
the original un-encrypted content of the message. 
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Now let’s furthermore consider the same example above, only this time all traffic 
is salted and encrypted at all nodes in the communication path. Thus, the adversary is not 
able to detect that the same packet with the same fingerprint has been sent from node A 
to B and then from node B to C. But still it can be easily detected that a message with the 
same size has been sent from node A to B and then from node B to C. This may lead to 
some usable information for the adversary in order to identify a pattern used by the 
routing algorithm, and moreover to disclose the identity of the sender node and the 
receiver node. Hence, it is always necessary to use uniformly-sized packets to further 
harden against traffic analysis attacks using packet sizes. 
In summary, the second requirement expects all messages to be divided into 
uniformly-sized packets, salted, and re-encrypted at every node in the communication 
path. 
3.4 Requirement 3: Never Reveal Patterns in Routing 
Traffic analysis can always be used to glean information from patterns in 
communication, even when encryption is utilized. Therefore, it is important never to 
reveal any patterns that may allow the adversaries to use traffic analysis techniques in 
order to collect and deduce information from these patterns. The use of static routes, 
similar to the routing algorithm used in The Onion Routing [Dingledine et al. 04], is an 
example of a protocol that reveals important information about the identity of the sender 
node as well as other nodes in the network. In the case of static routes, since the global 
adversary is capable of monitoring all the nodes in the network, whichever node(s) that is 
(are) used by the routing algorithm to relay the traffic can be monitored, therefore it is 
easy for the adversary to glean useful information from the pattern used to route packets. 
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For example, in The Onion Routing, the path used to route all communications during a 
session is static and is determined at the initial sender node at the time of establishing the 
connection. Later, this path is embedded in the packets so that each relay node would be 
aware of the exact IP address of the next node in the path. This technique cannot be used 
in cases where an active adversary is present, because any of the relay nodes may have 
been compromised by the adversary and used to report the path to the adversary. 
Furthermore, since the entire path is static and all the communication between any two 
nodes has to go through a particular set of relay nodes, from a global adversary point of 
view, the communication path between the initial sender and the ultimate receiver would 
be noticeably and consistently busy. This property may very well reveal the identity of 
the two ends of any given communication link. 
In summary, the routing algorithm used to address the issue of anonymous 
communication in the presence of active global adversaries has to somehow follow a 
random pattern with two important requirements: 1. Packets have to traverse through a 
set of random relay nodes so that traffic analysis cannot be used to determine the 
communication path, and 2. Ultimately, all packets have to arrive at the receiver node, no 
matter which relay nodes are used to route them. These two properties guarantee that, 
even though the communication path is not predefined statically, all packets are routed 
securely. 
3.5 Requirement 4: Always Use Random Noise 
Unobservability, which is a state that whether or not any communication exists is 
not distinguishable for the adversary, is a stronger property compared to anonymity. In 
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other words, if the adversary is not even capable of recognizing whether any two nodes 
are involved in any sort of communication, unobservability is achieved. 
 In order to add the property of unobservability to an anonymous system, random 
noise (a.k.a. cover traffic or dummy traffic) must be included in the system       
[Pfitzmann and Hansen 08]. Random noise is used to keep the network busy for most of 
the time, so that from a global adversary’s point of view, it is not distinguishable at any 
point in time whether any node has started a new communication with another node, or 
the traffic that is being monitored is dummy traffic. This property effectively increases 
the level of anonymity provided by an anonymous system. 
 It must be stated that too much dummy traffic may result in heavy network traffic 
which may lead to slow communication or even packet drops. Thus, it is important to 
generate a level of random noise that while achieving unobservability, does not 






4.1 Chapter Overview 
A number of requirements for communication anonymity/unobservability were 
proposed and discussed in Chapter III. Based on those requirements, a new anonymous 
system to provide enhanced communication unobservability in the presence of active 
global adversaries was designed. This chapter contains a detailed specification of the 
underlying network architecture used in the proposed system. The next two chapters 
present the details of the sender anonymity and the receiver anonymity modules, both of 
which take advantage of the networking architecture discussed in this chapter.  
4.2 Network Topology 
The proposed system is a structured peer to peer system in which peers are 
grouped into clusters of nodes called Clans such that any node in a clan is connected to 
all other nodes in that clan at all times. In other words, a clan is a complete graph of 
collaborative nodes. A clan that consists of p nodes is called a Clan-p. For example, a 
cluster of six nodes forms a Clan-6. A node has to be a part of a clan in order to be able to 
communicate with other nodes in the network. 
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4.3 Clan ID 
Each clan in the network is uniquely identifiable by a Clan ID. The Clan ID is a 
2-byte unsigned number (0 to 65,535) that is uniquely assigned to a clan at the time it is 
formed. This process is described in Section 4.7 below. 
4.4 Interface Node  
In order for nodes in two different clans to be able to communicate, they must 
have an IP address representing the other clan. This IP address, as discussed in Chapters 
V and VI, is then used by each party as the entry point to the other clan. Thus, each clan 
has to have the IP address of one of the nodes in that clan to use as the address of that 
clan. The node used in for this purpose is called the Interface Node and is randomly 
chosen from among the nodes in a clan. 
4.5 Network Metadata Catalog 
The Network Metadata Catalog (NMC) is a set of properties unique to the 
network that is maintained by all nodes in the network. The NMC contains a constant 
representing the network maximum clan size as well as the list of all Clan IDs in the 
network, along with the IP address and the public key of the interface node for each clan. 
The node designated as the interface node for a particular clan may be different at 
different times. This random non-permanent designation is meant to prevent the creation 





4.6 Clan Metadata Catalog 
The Clan Metadata Catalog (CMC) is a set of properties unique to each clan that 
has to be maintained by all nodes in the clan. In addition to the Clan ID, the CMC 
contains the IP addresses of all nodes in a clan along with their public keys.  
4.7 Parent Clan and Spawning a New Clan 
One of the properties of a network is a constant representing the maximum clan 
size, which is the maximum number of nodes allowed in a single clan in the network, and 
is assigned by the network administrator at the creation time of the first node. Consider 
the situation that at the time of establishing a connection when a new node attaches to a 
clan that contains the maximum number of allowed nodes. In such a case, the hosting 
clan, called the Parent Clan, is divided into two new clans, each containing half of the 
nodes in the original parent clan. This process is called Spawning. 
 When a clan is spawned from its parent clan, a new unique Clan ID is assigned to 
it by the parent clan and then the NMC and the CMC for the two clans are updated to 
reflect the changes. Finally, these changes are propagated to all other clans in the network 
which would subsequently be reflected in all the nodes in the network. 
4.8 Bridge Node and Connection Establishment 
The Connection Establishment process is the set of steps that are required to be 
completed before a new node becomes a member of the network. In order for a new node 
to join the network, it has to have the IP address of at least one of the nodes in the 
network. This node is called the Bridge Node. The Bridge Node is responsible for 
introducing new nodes to the network. The initial node to form a network is the only 
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exception to this rule, in that it is allowed to introduce itself to the network. Once the IP 
address of the Bridge Node is provided, the prospective node starts the hand-shaking 
process as explained below. At the end of this process, the prospective node becomes a 
member of the network and only then is the node allowed to communicate with other 
nodes in the network. 
4.9 Handshaking 
Handshaking is the process of introducing a new node to the network and 
transferring the necessary information to the prospective node so that it would be able to 
communicate with other nodes in the network. This process is executed immediately after 
that the prospective node successfully connects to a Bridge Node for the first time. 
Handshaking consists of the following three steps. 
1. Download the CMC. 
2. Download the NMC. 
3. Establish a connection to all other nodes in the clan. 
After handshaking, the new node is considered a member of the network and is 
able to communicate with any other node in the network. Note that the spawning process 
(if required) is the Bridge Node’s responsibility and does not require any additional 
action from the prospective node. 
4.10 Design Rationale 
Principal idea behind this design is that by clustering nodes into clans, nodes 
would be able to obfuscate the incoming and outgoing traffic. This can be done by 
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randomly distributing the traffic among several nodes in the clan in such a way that, from 
the adversary’s point of view, the best guess to determine the initial sender of a message 
or the ultimate receiver of a message would be the entire group of nodes in a particular 
clan. In other words, if all the nodes in a clan are partly responsible for obfuscating the 
outgoing traffic from the entire clan or, in an analogous sense, if all the nodes in a clan 
are partly responsible for obfuscating the incoming traffic, then the adversary would not 
be able to distinguish between the nodes that simply relay the traffic on the one hand, and 
the particular nodes that are actually sending or receiving the message on the other hand.  
This property is achieved by relaying the other nodes’ traffic (i.e., nodes other 
than the original sender) in such a way that none of the nodes in the network are readily 
aware of the identity of the original sender. This process is described in more details in 
Chapter V. 
4.11 Message Format 
All communication among nodes in the proposed protocol are packaged in a 
special messaging format. This format, in the spirit of the requirements mentioned in 
Chapter III, was specifically designed for this system to reduce the level of information 
that an adversary may deduce from traffic analysis of messages in the network. Thus, in 
order to hide the correspondence between the messages arriving at a node and those 
departing from a node, which otherwise would be revealed via traffic analysis of the 
packets’ sizes, all packets are of a uniform size of 1452 bytes.  
The packet size of 1452 bytes is the maximum segment size (MSS) for optimum 
communication on TCP and IPv4 over IEEE 802.3 networks which also fits in Ethernet 
v2 networks [Postel and Reynolds 88]. It is calculated by subtracting the TCP header size 
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(i.e., 20) and IPv4 header size (i.e., 20) from the maximum transmission unit (MTU) used 
in the IEEE 802.3 networks (i.e., 1492). The reason IEEE 802.3 MTU was selected 
instead of Ethernet v2 MTU is that the former is smaller than the latter (i.e., 1500), which 
means that packets generated in this system will not cause fragmentation either on IEEE 
802 networks or Ethernet v2 networks, hence resulting in better performance on both 
networks. 
 A message, as illustrated in Figure 1, is comprised of the following four 
segments: 
1. Target Clan ID: The 2-byte ID of the clan of which the receiver node is a 
member. 
2. Priority: A 2-byte value used for aging to prevent the indefinite postponement of 
forwarding a message. The mechanism used to assign and update this value is 
described in Chapter V. 
3. Signature: A 2-byte encrypted value used by the routing algorithm as a flag to 
determine whether or not the message is intended for the receiver (for more 
details see Chapter V).  
4. Payload: The actual message body encrypted by the receiver’s public key and 



















5.1 Chapter Overview 
The principal idea for the sender anonymity module of the proposed system is 
that, if nodes obfuscate their outgoing traffic in such a way that an adversary is not able 
to identify whether a node itself is the initial sender or the packet actually originated from 
some other node in the network, then the adversary will not be able to accurately identify 
the initial sender. In other words, the protocol requires all nodes in a clan (for a definition 
see Section 4.2) to voluntarily relay the other nodes’ traffic randomly. As a result, the 
initial sender node would not be identifiable by the adversary. 
5.2 Message Construction 
The first step to start a communication is to create the message. Message 
construction takes place at the sender node and requires the sender node to have the IP 
address, the public key, and the clan ID of the ultimate receiver node. The message is 
then constructed by assigning the receiver’s clan ID to the Target Clan ID field, 
assigning the encrypted message body (padded to fill up the allocated space) to the 
Payload field, assigning a random value between 1 and 65,535 (as described in more 
details below in Section 5.3) to the Priority field, and assigning the message signature (as 
described in Chapter VI) to the Signature field. 
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5.3 Unpredictable Aging Algorithm 
An important aspect of the proposed system is the randomized method of routing 
packets (as discussed in Section 5.4). Because of this random process, it is theoretically 
possible for a packet to fall in a loop and never reach its destination. Therefore, a method 
of aging has to be deployed to prevent the indefinite postponement of the routing of the 
messages. For this purpose, a priority value is added to each message to represent how 
urgently a message has to be routed compared to other messages in the waiting list. 
Calculating the priority of a message is one of the crucial steps in hiding the 
identity of the initial sender. This is due to the fact that if the first node in a 
communication path after the original sender of a message (i.e., the first node in the 
sequence of nodes that are used to relay the message) is an agent of the adversary, it 
would be possible for that node to identify the original sender by analyzing the priority 
assigned to the message, unless an unpredictable sequence of numbers is used to assign 
priorities.  
In other words, when aging is used to prevent indefinite postponement, as a 
message goes through the first node after the original sender, it might be possible to 
determine the source of the message by analyzing the priority assigned to the message. 
Thus, in the proposed system, an aging algorithm was introduced to address this issue. To 
initialize the priority of a message, several methods can be used. One method would be 
assigning a specific number as the initial priority for all messages. In this case, if a 
message is sent to the next node before going through the aging process even once, it 
would be detectable by the first node after the sender. Another method would be 
assigning a random number as a message’s initial priority. Now, unless the aging 
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algorithm generates a virtually untraceable sequence of numbers, it would be easy to spot 
the sender in cases that either the maximum or the minimum random value is chosen as 
the initial priority of a message.  
It is proposed that a suitable approach to tackle this issue is by designing an aging 
algorithm that produces a virtually untraceable sequence of numbers. In other words, 
given a priority value, one must not be able to confidently determine the previous priority 
value before the last aging iteration. It also goes without saying that, in order for the 
priorities to have meaningful values that can be used to prioritize the messages, the 
resulting sequence of number has to be convergent to a certain number. 
Furthermore, even if the priority is initialized to a random number and the aging 
algorithm only predictably and intuitively decreases/increases the priority value, then 
there must be a maximum/minimum number, which in case this maximum/minimum 
value is used by the original sender, again the first node in the path would be able to 
identify the original sender. Therefore, the priority value not only has to be initialized to a 
random number, but also the aging process must at some points increase this value and at 
other points decrease this value, keeping in mind that, in order to prevent indefinite 
postponement, the priority values have to converge.  
For this purpose, the Collatz Conjecture was used to generate untraceable iteration 




















It has been demonstrated that the numbers generated by the 3x+1 function in the range of 
2 bytes, which is the range under consideration for the priority field of the proposed 
message format, always converge to 1 [Leavens and Vermeulen 92]. In other words, the 
recurrence relation above produces sequences of numbers in such a way that a sequence 
always ends in 1. Furthermore, it is not possible to confidently determine the value of an-1 
for all values an (e.g., assuming that an = 20, then an-1 can be either 40 or 13). This 










































Figure 2: Colltaz Graph 
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As shown above, even though function T(n) is a convergent function, it is not 
monotonic. This property is suitable for anonymous aging because, as was mentioned 
earlier, the combination of a monotonic function and a fixed maximum/minimum value 
may result in a predictable priority value which can be used by the adversary to identify 




 represent the priority of a message after n iterations. Therefore, P
(0)
 will 
be the initial value assigned as the priority of a message. 
)65535mod(1P(0) rand  [1] 
Now having P
(n-1)
, the value of P
(n)
 is calculated using one of the following equations. 
If P
(n-1)
 is even:  
2PP 1)-(n(n)   [2] 
If P
(n-1)
 is odd and 655352)1(3P
1)-(n  :  
2)1(3PP 1)-(n(n)   [3] 
If P
(n-1)
 is odd and 655352)1(3P
1)-(n  :  
1P(n)   [4] 
Equation [4] is introduced to prevent an overflow error when the generated number does 
not fit in 2 bytes and also to avoid possible loops in the sequence of numbers. 
To sum up, at the time of creation of a message, a random number is used to 
assign a priority to it as in Equation [1] and subsequently at each iteration a new value for 
the priority is calculated using one of the equations [2], [3], or [4].  
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5.4 Routing Algorithm 
The routing algorithm is the most important component of the sender anonymity 
part of the proposed system. The routing algorithm is in fact responsible for transferring 
messages from a sender to the receiver’s clan while making every attempt to hide the 
identity of the sender node. The rest of the process i.e., after the routing algorithm 
delivers the message to the receiver’s clan, which is to transfer the message to the 
ultimate receiver, is the job of the receiver module that is discussed in Chapter VI.  
In the proposed system, each node in the network maintains a priority queue 
(called Outbox) of the outgoing messages, with the message priorities being stored in the 
priority fields of the messages, with the higher values signifying a lower priority. So the 
priority value of 0 represents the highest priority and the priority value of 65,535 
represents the lowest priority. 
 The Outbox priority queue is used to hold the outgoing messages. Thus, in order 
to send a message, a sender node has to construct a message object and insert it into the 
local Outbox. After this point, the routing algorithm will take the message and route it 
throughout the network until it reaches its destination clan. 
The routing algorithm was implemented as a separate thread (or process), called 
the engine, which has to be running on all nodes in the network at all times. The routing 
algorithm is based on the idea that each node has to help the other nodes in the same clan 
to hide their identity from the global adversary. This is done in a randomized fashion in 
such a way that it is not easily detectable which node in a clan is the original sender of a 
message. Thus, it could be argued that the closest that the adversary can get to identifying 
the sender is finding the clan of which the original sender is a member.  
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The proposed routing algorithm is comprised of two distinct actions. One action is 
picking the message with highest priority in the Outbox (the head of the queue) and 
sending it to the interface node of the receiver’s clan as specified in the message’s Target 
field. The other action is fetching a message from a random node in the sender’s clan and 
inserting that message in the local Outbox queue. The routing algorithm decides which 
one of the above-mentioned actions to take based on the Anonymity Level Indicator (p). 
This number represents the probability of choosing the first action over the second action. 
For example, let 35.0p  then 35% of the time the first action is taken and 65% of the 
time the second action is taken. In other words, in this clan, 35% of the time a node 
would send a message to the destination, and 65% of the time a node would help relay the 
other nodes’ traffic.  
Note that the anonymity level indicator has to be 10  p , otherwise, either no 
messages will be sent to their destinations or all messages will be sent to their 
destinations directly from the original sender. Thus, it could be argued that the lower the 
value of p, the higher the anonymity provided by the system. Put differently, the higher 
the number of times that a node decides to forward a message to the ultimate receiver, the 
lower the level of anonymity would be that the system provides.  
The routing algorithm can be best described in pseudo code as follows. 
Randomized-Anonymous-Routing 
1 while (true) { 
2     r ← rand() % 100 
3     if (r ≤ p*100) { 
4         # Send Local Traffic 
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5         message ← Outbox.head 
6         receiver ← Interface Node of the target clan 
7         send message to the receiver 
8     } else { 
9         # Relay Other Traffic 
10         pick a node in the clan 
11         message ← remote Outbox.head 
12         push message to local Outbox 
13     } 
14     Age-Queue() 




1 # Update the Priorities of All Messages 
2 for i ← 0 to Outbox.size { 
3     message ← Outbox.head 
4     pop the head of the Outbox 
5     pr ← message.priority 
6     if (pr is even) { 
7         pr = pr/2 
8     } else if ((3pr + 1)/2 < 65535) { 
9         pr = (3pr + 1)/2 
28 
 
10     } else { 
11         pr = 1 
12     } 
13     message.priority ← pr 




1 # Immediately Forward Messages with Priority 1 
2 do { 
3     message ← Outbox.head 
4     if (message.priority = 1) { 
5         receiver ← Interface Node of the target clan 
6         send message to the receiver 
7         pop the head of the Outbox 
8     }  
9 } while (message.priority = 1) 
It is worthy of mention that the communications between two nodes in the same 
clan is exactly the same as communications between two nodes in two different clans, 
except that in this case, a message would always go through at least one relay node, 
which plays the role of the interface node for the target clan. 
In summary, to initiate a message, the sender node simply creates the message and 
pushes it into the local Outbox. And, to route the messages in the Outbox, each node has 
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to randomly decide whether to send the highest priority message to the respective 
receiver’s clan or to request a new message from another randomly selected node to be 
relayed by that node. Finally, all messages with the highest possible priority are 
forwarded to their respective receiver’s clans, hence no node would wander around 
indefinitely. It must be stated that the unpredictable nature of the proposed aging 
algorithm may result in having several nodes with the highest possible priority at the 
same time in a node’s local Outbox priority queue. Thus, in order to prevent starvation, it 






6.1 Chapter Overview 
The issue of receiver anonymity is a more challenging problem compared to the 
issue of sender anonymity. This is singly due to the fact that every packet in the network 
has to somehow arrive at a receiver node. This cannot be obfuscated as easily as sending 
packets. Also, perhaps for this very reason, not much work has been reported in the 
literature on this issue, and in fact most of what is reported is based on a single idea of 
multicasting messages instead of transferring them right to the ultimate receiver    
[Waters et al. 03]. 
The principal idea for the receiver anonymity module of the proposed system is as 
Follows. The traffic is routed to several nodes instead of just to the ultimate receiver 
node, only the intended receiver is able to find out whether a message was targeted at that 
node or another node, and is able to actually decrypt the message and access the un-
encrypted contents of the message. So, a group of potential receivers may be held 
responsible for any given message, thus achieving receiver anonymity. In this chapter, 




6.2 Message Signature 
As discussed in Chapter IV, each message in the proposed system carries an extra 
two bytes of Signature. This value is used by the nodes to decide whether or not a 
message is meant for them. Note that the messages do not contain any information 
regarding the actual IP address or anything else that would reveal the actual identity of 
the receiver node. 
 The message signature is a 16-bit value that is generated at the sender node. Then 
the signature is attached to the beginning of the actual message body and is encrypted by 
the receiver’s public key. Once a node receives a message, it has to decrypt the message 
body using its own private key. This is when the signature value can be used to tell 
whether or not the message was actually meant for a specific node. 
 The signature value is comprised of two separate bytes. The first byte (the most 
significant 8 bits) is called SIG0 and the second byte (the least significant 8 bits) is called 
SIG1. SIG0 is calculated by XORing the first 8 bits of the message body with 8 ones 
(11111111), and SIG1 is calculate by XORing SIG0 with the second 8 bits of the 
message body. Let’s consider both the message body and the signature as a string of 
zeros and ones called MSG and SIG. Now the following formula generates the message 
























































When the message signature is ready, it is attached to the message body and the 
entire message is then encrypted by the receiver’s public key. Now, once a node receives 
a message, it has to decrypt the message body using the local private key and do the 
reverse operation to check whether or not the message was meant for that node. This 
process is discussed in details in the next section. 
6.3 Routing Algorithm 
As described in Section 5.4, messages are routed from one of the nodes in the 
sender’s clan to one of the nodes in the receiver’s clan called the interface node. Once the 
interface node receives a message, it is responsible for delivering it to the ultimate 
receiver. But, this is not a straightforward task, because the only information that any 
node at this point has regarding this message is that the ultimate receiver node is one 
node among all the nodes in the receiver’s clan. Even the ultimate receiver node itself is 
not aware of the final piece of the puzzle until it decrypts the first four bytes of the 
message body. The first four bytes contain the message signature and the first two bytes 
of the message body that have been used by the sender node to calculate the message 
signature.  
 The proposed routing is not a complete and sophisticated algorithm. Once the 
interface node of the receiver’s clan receives a message, it has to extract the target clan 
ID and the priority from the message, and forward the message to all the nodes in the 
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clan. Note that the list of nodes in a clan is already provided to each node in each node’s 
CMC. In other words, once a message enters a clan, it is broadcasted among all the nodes 
in that clan. Now all nodes have a copy of the message, but the message is intended for 
only one of them. 
 The process of identifying the receiver of a message takes place at each node at 
the time of message arrival. Once the message is completely transferred to a node, the 
node has to use its own private key and decrypt at least the first four bytes of the 
message. Let’s call the binary string consisting of the first two decrypted bytes of the 
message SIG, and the second two bytes of the message MSG. A node in the receiver’s 
clan uses the following formula to check if it is in fact the ultimate receiver. 
If the first byte of SIG equals to the second byte of SIG XOR the second byte of 
MSG, and the result of XORing the first byte of MSG with the first byte of SIG equals 
eight ones, then the message has indeed arrived at the intended receiver, otherwise the 
node can simply drop the message. 
 For example, suppose the first two bytes of the message body is: 
MSG := 11001100 10101100 
Thus, the message signature would be: 
SIG0 = 11001100 XOR 11111111 = 00110011 
SIG1 = SIG0 XOR 10101100 = 10011111 
Therefore: 
SIG = 00110011 10011111 
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Now if a node receives a message the first four bytes of which after decrypting look like  
00110011 10011111 11001100 10101100, then that node is the intended 
ultimate receiver, because: 
BYTE1 = BYTE2 XOR BYTE4 
and 
BYTE1 = BYTE3 XOR 11111111 






7.1 Chapter Overview 
In order to evaluate and test the proposed design, a simulation program was 
implemented. In this program, all clients maintain a thread-safe queue as the Outbox and 
also an Engine program which is the actual implementation of the routing algorithm. The 
engine runs on a separate thread and is responsible for routing the messages in the local 
Outbox. Furthermore, a central module responsible for initializing clients, assigning 
parameters, and collecting and reporting statistics was implemented. In this chapter, the 
statistics generated from running the implemented simulation program are discussed. 
7.2 Sender Anonymity Simulation 
As mentioned previously, the receiver anonymity module follows an 
uncomplicated and straightforward routing algorithm (a variant of multicasting) that 
would not require simulation to demonstrate its workability. Hence, this chapter mostly 





In this experiment, the simulation program generated 100,000 messages for each 
of the 99 different anonymity level indicator values (0.01 to 0.99), and used the proposed 
routing algorithm to route them from the sender node to the receiver node. The graph 
below depicts the average number of nodes traversed by a message before arriving at the 
receiver clan in four different situations characterized by clan sizes of 5, 10, 20, and 50 
nodes. 
 
Figure 3: Average Sender/Receiver Distance vs. Anonymity Level Indicator 
 
As the graph shows, the lower the anonymity level indicator (for a definition see 
Section 5.4), the higher the number of nodes a message would traverse before getting to 
the receiver. This is a direct result of the fact that, when the anonymity level indicator is 
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would prefer to pass the local traffic to the other nodes instead of forwarding the traffic to 
the receiver node.  
The above graph also suggests that for low anonymity level indicators (below 
50%), the greater the number of nodes in a clan, the lower the distance traveled by the 
message. This can be justified by the observation that, when the number of nodes in a 
clan is increased and there is not much traffic in the network, messages stay longer in 
each Outbox. In other words, while monitoring a single message, when the number of 
nodes in a clan increases, that particular message would stay longer at each Outbox in the 
path from the sender to the receiver, hence the higher chance of being forwarded to the 
receiver as opposed to being sent to another node in the clan. 
 In another experiment, 100,000 packets were sent from a single node to some 
random receiver (in a different clan) and the number of communications between each 
node in the clan with nodes outside of that clan was calculated. This data can be used to 
determine whether the adversary is capable of detecting a pattern in the network from the 
number of communications in a clan, perhaps resulting in identifying the sender node. 
The graph below shows the percentage of communications between each node in a clan 
of size 5 with nodes outside the clan, keeping in mind that all traffic is originated from a 
single node. The ratio of total communication is the calculated by dividing the number of 
communications between each node with other nodes outside of that clan by the number 




Figure 4: Ratio of Total Communication in a Clan-5 vs. Anonymity Level Indicator 
 
It can be inferred from the above graph that, when the anonymity level indicator 
is increased, when only one node in the network is the originator of all packets in the 
network, it is more likely for the adversary to identify the sender node using traffic 
analysis. Thus, for the system to work as expected, it is best to adjust the anonymity level 
indicator according to the behavior of all the nodes in the network. In other words, when 
there are a few particular nodes in the network that initiate most of the traffic, the 
anonymity level indicator must be reduced to increase the level of anonymity provided by 
the system. On the other hand, in a situation where all nodes are equally contributing to 
the network traffic, the anonymity level indicator can be increased without the fear of 
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SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 
8.1 Summary 
In this thesis work, a new network protocol was introduced that provides 
enhanced communication unobservability in the presence of active global adversaries. 
The proposed system is comprised of two modules, namely the Sender Anonymity 
module and the Receiver Anonymity module. The combination of these two provides 
communication anonymity. Moreover, random noise was added to the system to provide 
some level of unobservability. It was also argued that, in order to hide any sort of pattern 
that would otherwise be revealed to an eavesdropper, an unpredictable aging algorithm 
must be used to assign priorities to messages. This aging algorithm was designed using 
the Collatz conjecture and was introduced in Chapter V. 
 Furthermore, a new network architecture based on groups of collaborative nodes 
called Clans was designed. The point was also advanced that, if all the nodes in a clan try 
to obfuscate the outgoing traffic from that clan, then from the adversary’s perspective, it 




 Moreover, a receiver anonymity module based on multicasting messages to all 
nodes in a clan, was designed and added to the system. When the receiver anonymity 
module is combined with the sender anonymity module, the system as a whole provides 
enhanced communication anonymity. Also, a mechanism for hiding the identity of the 
ultimate receiver node in the message body was introduced. 
 Finally, a simulation program to evaluate and test the proposed design was 
implemented and a couple of plots depicting the data collected from running the 
simulation along with a detailed discussion of each of the graphs were presented. 
8.2 Future Work 
A more comprehensive simulation of the system can be designed and 
implemented, for example, the receiver anonymity module can be simulated. Also, 
investigating the optimum maximum and minimum clan size as well as a mechanism for 
merging clans may improve the system’s performance. Moreover, improvements on the 
receiver anonymity module to design a new algorithm that would not broadcast all 
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Active Adversary A visible adversary that is capable of altering messages traversing 
a network [Kelly 09]. 
Aging The process of increasing the priority of messages while they are 
traversing through a network. 
Anonymity The state in which a specific subject is not identifiable within a 
set of subjects [Pfitzmann and Hansen 08]. 
Anonymity Level 
Indicator 
A number representing the probability of choosing to forward a 
message to the target clan over relaying the traffic of the other 
nodes in the clan. 
Bridge Node A node that is used by a prospective node to establish connection 
to a network. 
Clan-p A group of a maximum of p collaborative nodes in which each 
node is connected to all other nodes in that clan. 
Clan ID A 2-bytes unique value used to identify clans. It is assigned to 
each clan by the parent clan. 
Clan Metadata 
Catalog (CMC) 
A set of properties unique to each clan, containing the clan ID 
and the IP addresses of all the nodes in that clan along with their 
public keys.  
Communication 
Anonymity 
The state in which a message cannot be linked to any sender–
receiver pair and no message is linkable to a particular sender–
receiver pair [Kelly 09]. 
Communication 
Unobservability 
The state in which it is not detectable whether anything is sent 




Global Adversary An omnipresent adversary that has full access to the entire 
network of nodes and links [Kelly 09]. 
Hand-shaking The process of introducing a new node to the network and 
transferring the required information to the prospective node. 
Interface Node A node in a clan that is used by another node from outside the 
clan to communicate with that clan. 
Network Metadata 
Catalog (NMC) 
A set of properties unique to the network, containing the 
maximum clan size, the list of all clans in the network, and the IP 
address of an interface node for each clan along with the public 
key of the interface nodes. 
Outbox A priority queue maintained by each node in the network that is 
used to store and sort messages based on their priorities (age). 
Parent Clan A clan that spawns a new clan after joining a new node that 
results in that clan having more nodes than the maximum allowed 
clan size. 
Random Noise Untargeted traffic which causes the network to appear busy at all 
times or most of the time (a.k.a. cover traffic or dummy traffic). 
Salting The process of adding random values to the contents of a 
message before encryption in order to harden against dictionary 
attacks. 
Unobservability The state in which an adversary is unable to observe anything 
regarding a communication, i.e., the adversary is unable to 





This appendix contains the complete source code of the simulation program. 
 
/** 
 * File: Main.java 
 * Author: Peyman Taher 









public class Main { 
  
 private static Log log = LogFactory.getLog(Main.class); 
  
 private Engine engine = null; 
 
 public static void main(String[] args) { 
   
  log.debug("*** PROGRAM EXECUTION BEGINS ***"); 
   
  Main app = new Main(); 
  app.init(); 
  app.run(); 
 } 
  
 private void init() { 
  engine = Engine.getInstance(); 
 } 
  
 private void run() { 







 * File: Constants.java 
 * Author: Peyman Taher 





public class Constants { 
  
   // path to the configuration file 
        public static final String PATH_CONFIG_FILE =  
"conf/anonsim.cfg.xml"; 
         
        // total number of clients in the network 
        public static final String TAGS_NUMBER_OF_CLIENTS =  
"number-of-clients"; 
         
        // maximum clan size allowed 
        public static final String TAGS_FAMILY_SIZE =  
"clan-size"; 
         
        // value of the anonymity level indicator 
        public static final String TAGS_ANONYMITY_LEVEL =  
"anonymity-level"; 
         
        // number of iterations the experiment has to be executed 
        public static final String TAGS_ITERATIONS =  
"iterations"; 
         
        // sleep time used to slow down the simulation so that 
        // it is more understandable 
        public static final String TAGS_SLEEP =  
"sleep"; 





 * File: ConfigLoader.java 
 * Author: Peyman Taher 










public class ConfigLoader { 
 
  // singleton instance of the class  
        private static ConfigLoader instance = null; 
         
        private Log log = LogFactory.getLog(ConfigLoader.class); 
         
        private XMLConfiguration config = null; 
 
        private ConfigLoader() { 
                config = new XMLConfiguration(); 
                 
                log.debug("Loading configuration file at: "  
                  + Constants.PATH_CONFIG_FILE); 
 
                try { 
                        config.load(Constants.PATH_CONFIG_FILE); 
                } catch (ConfigurationException e) { 
                        log.fatal("Unable to load configuration file: "  
                          + Constants.PATH_CONFIG_FILE); 
                        System.exit(-1); 
                } 
        } 
         
        public static ConfigLoader getInstance() { 
                if (instance == null) { 
                        instance = new ConfigLoader(); 
                } 
                return instance; 
        } 
         
        public XMLConfiguration getConfig() { 
                return config; 
        } 
         
        public String getRequiredString(String key) { 
                String res = null; 
                try { 
                        res = config.getString(key); 
                } catch (Exception e) { 
                        log.warn("Unable to load configuration for: "  
+ key); 
                } finally { 
                        if (res == null) { 
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                                log.fatal( 
"Missing required configuration key: \""  
                                + key + "\""); 
                                System.exit(-1); 
                        } 
                } 
                return res; 
        } 
         
        public String[] getRequiredStringArray(String key) { 
                String[] res = null; 
                try { 
                        res = config.getStringArray(key); 
                } catch (Exception e) { 
                        log.warn("Unable to load configuration for: " 
 + key); 
                } finally { 
                        if (res == null || res.length == 0) { 
                                log.fatal( 
"Missing required configuration key: \""  
                                  + key + "\""); 
                                System.exit(-1); 
                        } 
                } 
                return res; 





 * File: Message.java 
 * Author: Peyman Taher 





public class Message { 
 
 private String body = ""; 
 private Integer receiverId = null; 
 private int nodeCounter = 0; 
 
 public String getMessageBody() { 
  return body; 
 } 
 
 public void setMessageBody(String body) { 
  this.body = body; 
 } 
 
 public Integer getReceiverId() { 
  return receiverId; 
 } 
 
 public void setReceiverId(Integer receiverId) { 
  this.receiverId = receiverId; 
 } 
 
 public void incNodeCounter() { 
  nodeCounter++; 
 } 
  
 public int getNodeCounter() { 






 * File: Client.java 
 * Author: Peyman Taher 
















public class Client implements Runnable { 
 
 private static Log log = LogFactory.getLog(Client.class); 
 
 private Integer id = null; 
 private Queue<Message> outbox =  
new ConcurrentLinkedQueue<Message>(); 
 private ArrayList<Client> clan =  
new ArrayList<Client>(); 
 private double anonind = 0.0; 
 private int traffic = 0; 
  
 private static final int ANONYMITY_LEVEL; 
  
 static { 
  ConfigLoader cfg = ConfigLoader.getInstance(); 
  ANONYMITY_LEVEL = Integer.parseInt(cfg.getRequiredString( 
    Constants.TAGS_ANONYMITY_LEVEL)); 
 } 
 
 private String prefix = null; 
 
 @SuppressWarnings("unused") 
 private Client() { 
 } 
 
 public double getAnonind() { 
  return anonind; 
 } 
 
 public void setAnonind(double anonind) { 
  this.anonind = anonind; 
 } 
 
 public Client(Integer id, double anonind) { 
  this.id = id; 
  this.anonind = anonind; 





 public Integer getId() { 
  return id; 
 } 
 
 public void setClan(final ArrayList<Client> clan) { 
  this.clan = clan; 
 } 
 
 public ArrayList<Client> getClan() { 
  return clan; 
 } 
 
 public Message requestOutgoing() { 
  synchronized (outbox) { 
   if (! outbox.isEmpty()) { 
    Message msg = outbox.poll(); 
    log.debug(prefix + "PASS"); 
    return msg; 
   } 
  } 
  return null; 
 } 
  
 public void send(Message msg) { 
  synchronized (outbox) { 
   outbox.add(msg); 
  } 
 } 
  
 public int getTraffic() { 
  return traffic; 
 } 
  
 public void resetTraffic() { 
  traffic = 0; 
 } 
 
 private boolean doISend() { 
  int percent = ANONYMITY_LEVEL; 
  Random rand = new Random(); 
  int num = rand.nextInt(100); 
  if (num < percent) { 
   return true; 
  } else { 
   return false; 
  } 
 } 
 
 public void run() { 
  Random rand = new Random(); 
 
  while (true) { 
   boolean iSend = doISend(); 
   if (iSend) { 
    synchronized (outbox) { 
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     if (! outbox.isEmpty()) { 
      Message msg = outbox.poll(); 
 
      Engine engine = 
 Engine.getInstance(); 
      engine.reportSent(this, msg); 
       
      traffic++; 
     } 
    } 
   } else { 
    int max = getClan().size(); 
    Client cl = null; 
    do { 
     int index = rand.nextInt(max); 
     cl = getClan().get(index); 
    } while (cl.getId() == this.getId()); 
 
    Message msg = cl.requestOutgoing(); 
    if (msg != null) { 
     synchronized (outbox) { 
      msg.incNodeCounter(); 
      outbox.add(msg); 
     } 
    } 
   } 







 * File: Engine.java 
 * Author: Peyman Taher 
















public class Engine { 
 
 private static final int MAX_CLAN_SIZE; 
 private static final int ITERATIONS; 
  
 static { 
  ConfigLoader cfg = ConfigLoader.getInstance(); 
   
  // maximum number of nodes in each clan 
  MAX_CLAN_SIZE = Integer.parseInt(cfg.getRequiredString( 
    Constants.TAGS_FAMILY_SIZE)); 
   
  // iterations to calculate average distance 
  ITERATIONS = Integer.parseInt(cfg.getRequiredString( 
    Constants.TAGS_ITERATIONS)); 
 } 
  
 // singleton instance of the class 
 private static Engine instance = null; 
 
 private final String body = "DUMMY_MESSAGE"; 
 
 private Log log = LogFactory.getLog(Engine.class); 
 private ArrayList<Client> clients = new ArrayList<Client>(); 
  
 public static Engine getInstance() { 
  if (instance == null) { 
   instance = new Engine(); 
  } 
  return instance; 
 } 
 
 // singleton class 
 private Engine() { 
  init(); 
 } 
 
 private void init() { 
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  log.debug("Initializing engine..."); 
 
  log.debug("Populating " + MAX_CLAN_SIZE + " clients..."); 
  for (int i = 0; i < MAX_CLAN_SIZE; ++i) { 
   Client client = new Client(i, 1); 
   clients.add(client); 
  } 
  log.debug("Done with populating clients."); 
 
  log.debug("Notifying clients of other nodes in the clan."); 
  Iterator<Client> iter = clients.iterator(); 
  while (iter.hasNext()) { 
   Client cl = iter.next(); 
   cl.setClan(clients); 
  } 
  log.debug("Done with notification."); 
   
  log.debug("Starting clients..."); 
  iter = clients.iterator(); 
  while (iter.hasNext()) { 
   Client c = iter.next(); 
   Thread t = new Thread(c); 
   t.start(); 
  } 
  log.debug("Done with starting clients."); 
  log.debug("Done with initializing engine."); 
 } 
 
 public ArrayList<Client> getClients() { 
  return clients; 
 } 
  
 private int totalDistance = 0; 
 private boolean received = false; 
 public void reportSent(Client sender, Message msg) { 
  log.info("Reporting message sent:"); 
  log.info("Sender: " + sender.getId()); 
  log.info("Nodes traversed: " + msg.getNodeCounter()); 
  log.info("... and we're done."); 
  totalDistance += msg.getNodeCounter(); 
  received = true; 
 }  
  
 public void run() { 
  try { 
   for (double p = 0.01; p <= 1.0; p += 0.01) { 
    Iterator<Client> iter = clients.iterator(); 
    while (iter.hasNext()) { 
     iter.next().setAnonind(p); 
    } 
 
    for (int i = 0; i < ITERATIONS; ++i) { 
      
     Message out = new Message(); 
     out.setReceiverId(0); 




     log.debug("Message: " + "|TARGET|" 
       + out.getMessageBody()  
+ "|"); 
  
     Client sender = clients.get(0); 
     sender.send(out); 
     while (! received) { 
      Thread.sleep(1); 
     } 
     received = false; 
    } 
     
    double avgd =  
(double) totalDistance / ITERATIONS; 
    DecimalFormat df = new DecimalFormat("#.##"); 
    System.out.println(df.format(p)  
+ " \t\t\t\t" + avgd); 
     
    iter = clients.iterator(); 
    while (iter.hasNext()) { 
     Client cl = iter.next(); 
     System.out.print(cl.getTraffic() + "\t"); 
     cl.resetTraffic(); 
    } 
    System.out.println(); 
     
    totalDistance = 0; 
   } 
     
   System.exit(0); 
  } catch (Exception e) { 
   e.printStackTrace(); 







 File: anonsim.cfg.xml 
 Author: Peyman Taher 
















# File: log4j.properties 
# Author: Peyman Taher 
# Date: February 02, 2010 
# 
 
# the root logger's level is set to “error” 
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